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Secrets & recovery

When the Coordinator is configured with the initial manifest, it generates a random secret seed. From this seed, it uses an HKDF to derive the CA root key and a signing key for the manifest history. This derivation is deterministic, so the seed can be used to bring any Coordinator to this Coordinator's state.

The secret seed is returned to the user on the first call to contrast set, encrypted with the user's public seed share owner key. If no seed share owner key is provided, a key is generated and stored in the working directory.

danger

The secret seed and the seed share owner key are highly sensitive.

  • If either of them leak, the Contrast deployment should be considered compromised.
  • If the secret seed is lost, data encrypted with Contrast secrets can't be recovered.
  • If the seed share owner key is lost, the Coordinator can't be recovered and needs to be redeployed with a new manifest.

Persistence

The Coordinator runs as a StatefulSet with a dynamically provisioned persistent volume. This volume stores the manifest history and the associated runtime policies. The manifest isn't considered sensitive information, because it needs to be passed to the untrusted infrastructure in order to start workloads. However, the Coordinator must ensure its integrity and that the persisted data corresponds to the manifests set by authorized users. Thus, the manifest is stored in plain text, but is signed with a private key derived from the Coordinator's secret seed.

Recovery

When a Coordinator starts up, it doesn't have access to the signing secret and can thus not verify the integrity of the persisted manifests. It needs to be provided with the secret seed, from which it can derive the signing key that verifies the signatures. This procedure is called recovery and is initiated by the seed share owner. The CLI decrypts the secret seed using the private seed share owner key, verifies the Coordinator and sends the seed through the Recover method. The Coordinator authenticates the seed share owner, recovers its key material, and verifies the manifest history signature.

Workload Secrets

The Coordinator provides each workload a secret seed during attestation. This secret can be used by the workload to derive additional secrets for example to encrypt persistent data. Like the workload certificates, it's written to the secrets/workload-secret-seed path under the shared Kubernetes volume contrast-secrets.

warning

The seed share owner can decrypt data encrypted with secrets derived from the workload secret, because they can themselves derive the workload secret. If the data owner fully trusts the seed share owner (when they're the same entity, for example), they can securely use the workload secrets.

Secure persistence

Remember that persistent volumes from the cloud provider are untrusted. Applications can set up trusted storage on top of an untrusted block device using the contrast.edgeless.systems/secure-pv annotation. This annotation enables contrast generate to configure the Initializer to set up a LUKS-encrypted volume at the specified device and mount it to a specified volume. The LUKS encryption utilizes the workload secret introduced above. Configure any workload resource with the following annotation:

metadata:
annotations:
contrast.edgeless.systems/secure-pv: "device-name:mount-name"

This requires an existing block device named device-name which is configured as a volume on the resource. The volume mount-name has to be of type EmptyDir and will be created if not present. The resulting Initializer will mount both the device and configured volume and set up the encrypted storage. Workload containers can then use the volume as a secure storage location:

apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: StatefulSet
metadata:
annotations:
contrast.edgeless.systems/secure-pv: "device:secure"
name: my-statefulset
spec:
template:
spec:
containers:
- name: my-container
image: "my-image@sha256:..."
volumeMounts:
- mountPath: /secure
mountPropagation: HostToContainer
name: secure
volumes:
- name: device
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: my-pvc
runtimeClassName: contrast-cc

Usage cryptsetup subcommand

Alternatively, the cryptsetup subcommand of the Initializer can be used to manually set up encrypted storage. The cryptsetup subcommand takes two arguments cryptsetup -d [device-path] -m [mount-point], to set up a LUKS-encrypted volume at device-path and mount that volume at mount-point.

The following, slightly abbreviated resource outlines how this could be realized:

warning

This configuration snippet is intended to be educational and needs to be refined and adapted to your production environment. Using it as-is may result in data corruption or data loss.

apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: StatefulSet
metadata:
name: volume-tester
spec:
template:
spec:
containers:
- name: main
image: my.registry/my-image@sha256:0123... # <-- Original application requiring encrypted disk.
volumeMounts:
- mountPath: /state
mountPropagation: HostToContainer
name: share
initContainers:
- args:
- cryptsetup # <-- cryptsetup subcommand provided as args to the initializer binary.
- "--device-path"
- /dev/csi0
- "--mount-point"
- /state
image: "ghcr.io/edgelesssys/contrast/initializer:latest"
name: encrypted-volume-initializer
resources:
limits:
memory: 100Mi
requests:
memory: 100Mi
restartPolicy: Always
securityContext:
privileged: true # <-- This is necessary for mounting devices.
startupProbe:
exec:
command:
- /bin/test
- "-f"
- /done
failureThreshold: 20
periodSeconds: 5
volumeDevices:
- devicePath: /dev/csi0
name: state
volumeMounts:
- mountPath: /state
mountPropagation: Bidirectional
name: share
volumes:
- name: share
emptyDir: {}
runtimeClassName: contrast-cc
volumeClaimTemplates:
- apiVersion: v1
kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
metadata:
name: state
spec:
accessModes:
- ReadWriteOnce
resources:
requests:
storage: 1Gi
volumeMode: Block # <-- The requested volume needs to be a raw block device.